Rising Powers, Responsibility and International Society by Gaskarth, Jamie
 
 
Rising Powers, Responsibility and International
Society
Gaskarth, Jamie
DOI:
10.1017/S0892679417000211
License:
Other (please specify with Rights Statement)
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Gaskarth, J 2017, 'Rising Powers, Responsibility and International Society', Ethics & International Affairs, vol.
31, no. 3, pp. 287-311. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679417000211
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This article has been published in a revised form in Ethics and International Affairs https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679417000211. This
version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Jamie
Gaskarth.
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
1 
 
Rising Powers, Responsibility, and International Society 
Jamie Gaskarth 
 
Abstract 
Responsibility is a key theme of recent debates over the ethics of international society. In 
particular, rising powers such as Brazil, China, and India regularly reject the idea that 
coercion should be a feature of world politics and portray military intervention as 
irresponsible. But this raises the problem of how a society’s norms can be upheld without 
coercive measures. Critics have accused them of “free riding” on existing great powers and 
failing to address the dilemma of how you deal with actors undermining societal values. This 
article examines writing on responsibility and international society, with reference to the 
English School, to identify why the willingness and capacity to use force—as well as creative 
thinking in this regard—are seen as important aspects of responsibility internationally. It then 
explores the statements made by Brazil, China, and India in UN Security Council meetings 
between 2011 and 2016 to uncover which actors they see as responsible and how they define 
responsible action. In doing so, it pinpoints areas of concurrence as well as disagreements in 
their understandings of the concept and concludes that Brazil and India have a more coherent 
and practical understanding of responsibility than China, which risks being labelled a “great 
irresponsible.” 
 
Key words: Rising Powers, responsibility, English School, Brazil, China, India, UN Security 
Council 
 
Debates over responsibility in international society go to the heart of how politics functions at 
the global level. In establishing chains of responsibility, we define relationships between 
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actors, attach identities to them, categorize their material and social power, and suggest what 
ethical obligations exist within their social sphere. As such, analyzing responsibility is vital to 
understanding how agency operates internationally and how it constitutes social relations 
within the international system.  
Over the last two decades two particular debates on responsibility in world politics 
have emerged. The first revolves around who is responsible for maintaining international 
society. The UN Security Council remains the primary forum for global security debates, but 
its membership is frequently criticized, and it has failed to reach agreement on how to 
manage a series of crises during this period.
1
 When it came to the interventions in Kosovo in 
1999 and Iraq in 2003, for example, Western states took it upon themselves to circumvent the 
Council and lead coalitions to uphold humanitarian norms or international law as they 
interpreted them;
2
 and in doing, so they faced—and continue to face—a backlash from the 
international community. More recent attempts to work within the UN system have 
encountered resistance, as in efforts to pass Security Council resolutions addressing the Syria 
crisis which have been met by seven vetoes to date from non-Western permanent members.
3
  
Similarly, efforts by Western states to pursue policies on nonmilitary security issues, 
such as climate change, the global financial crisis, and development, have led to coalitions of 
states challenging their agenda and their right to impose it on others—such as the BASIC 
group (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, and IBSA 
(India, Brazil, and South Africa) during the Doha Development Round. Recent years have 
also witnessed a broadening of global clubs to encompass more non-Western states (such as 
the G-20) and the emergence of new ones that define themselves in opposition to Western 
forms of global governance (such as the BRICS). As global power shifts away from the 
formerly dominant Anglo-European powers, their legitimacy and authority to decide and act 
on behalf of the international community has been cast into doubt. But there is a question 
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mark over which states are willing or able to take up the burden of maintaining international 
society’s institutions and norms. Rising powers such as China and India have been labeled 
“free riders,” accused of claiming the privileges of great power status without shouldering the 
burdens this position brings.
4
  
The second debate is over what constitutes responsible action. Western states have 
been censured by domestic critics and other states for their irresponsibility in resorting to 
force prematurely, blocking trade and development deals for protectionist reasons, and 
contributing to economic instability through their deregulation of financial markets.
5
 
Powerful non-Western states have in turn been accused by Western states of acting 
irresponsibly by preventing armed humanitarian intervention, engaging in their own 
protectionism, and failing to support the United Nations and other international institutions 
financially and politically.
6
 A burgeoning literature on “rising powers” sees Asia and the 
Global South challenging Western understandings of how international society should 
function, while at the same time states from these areas frequently define themselves as 
upholding traditional norms of sovereignty and nonintervention that, according to their view, 
are threatened by the West.
7
  
This article explores the idea of responsibility in light of these debates. Specifically, it 
aims to tease out how three significant rising powers—Brazil, China, and India—articulate 
the concept of responsibility in the setting of the Security Council, thereby providing a deeper 
understanding of how they interpret the concept, how far they challenge the assumptions of 
Western states, and what effects these ideas might have on the norms and practices of 
international society. These three states were chosen as their common association in a variety 
of multilateral forums, attracting acronyms including the BRICS, BICs and BASIC, make 
them a logical focus of analysis on non-Western approaches to responsibility. They are 
“rising powers” in the sense that the economic growth rates and military spending of China 
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and India place them on a trajectory to become the most powerful states in future decades, 
albeit at different rates, while Brazil’s economy briefly overtook that of the United Kingdom 
in 2011—supposedly heralding a shift of economic and political influence toward the Global 
South.
8
 
The first section examines the concept of responsibility and the variety of ways it can 
be interpreted in order to establish a theoretical context for the later empirical analysis of its 
rhetorical use by Brazil, China, and India. The term tends to be used unreflectively in 
academic and policy circles, but this analysis will reveal tensions between agent and 
structurally generated interpretations that play out in practice. It also provides a useful basis 
for the second section on the English School. English School writers, arguably above all other 
disciplinary approaches to international relations, have offered the most detailed examination 
of how responsibility is operationalized in international society; and their research into the 
role of great powers in maintaining this society provides a rich analysis of the logical 
underpinnings of the Anglo-European order. Setting out this framework is vital for evaluating 
how far and in what ways it is being challenged by new configurations of states. The third 
section investigates how Brazil, China, and India articulate the concept of responsibility in 
the setting of the Security Council. An analysis of the language in official Council statements 
by these countries reveals the extent to which they wish to challenge assumptions about the 
distribution and practice of responsibility in the future. I contend that China’s position, 
framing responsibility as being incompatible with the use of force, is incoherent from the 
English School perspective and faces a growing challenge from other great powers as 
irresponsible. India’s and Brazil’s more moderate positions, though problematic, are 
nevertheless far more constructive, because each has posited concrete ideas on how to 
respond to dilemmas over security governance and the use of force. 
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THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In order to understand how rising powers conceive of themselves and are conceived of by 
others as responsible actors, we must first look at the different ways that the concept of 
“responsibility” can be understood. Theorists and laypeople alike often describe 
responsibility in terms of either identity or action.
9
 When it comes to identity, we use the 
adjective responsible to suggest that an actor exhibits certain laudable characteristics—
maturity, prudence, discretion, forbearance. In other words, for some, responsibility is an 
attribute or quality that an actor possesses “regardless of a specific action.”10 The advantage 
of seeing responsibility as an attribute rather than a single action is that it captures the way 
actors define themselves over time and across a range of actions and situations. However, 
philosophers have disagreed over the degree to which identities have autonomy outside 
particular social contexts and practices.
11
 Who we are can never be entirely defined 
internally, as the work of identity construction is primarily done socially through an 
interactive process of self-definition and the interpretation and behavior of others.
12
 This can 
lead to cognitive dissonance if an actor perceives itself as responsible, while observers 
nonetheless view it as irresponsible.  
Furthermore, role theorists have noted that actors play social roles, such as 
“responsible adult” or “responsible power,” based on preexisting expectations of what these 
entail.
13
 As a result, what constitutes being “responsible” may to a large extent be 
predetermined at the social rather than individual level.
14
 Nevertheless, it would be an 
overstatement to suggest that individual actors play no part in their own identity formation. 
How we see ourselves is shaped by our interpretation of our past interactions, which are 
unique to us as individuals – lending individuals a level of autonomy from current social 
pressures.  It is thus best to see identity construction operating as a symbiosis between 
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autonomous, internally-derived characteristics and an external structure of ascribed roles and 
understandings.  
The other way of describing responsibility is in terms of our actions: behaving 
responsibly involves responding to the needs of others.
15
 A fundamental aspect of this 
interpretation is the assumption that an actor has the capacity to act.
16
 To be responsible, an 
actor must be able to respond in a way that would have a positive effect on the outcome. 
Agency comprises cognitive awareness as well as material capability.
17
 As Anthony Lang, 
Jr., puts it, “Responsibility . . . requires that an individual has the agency required to intend, 
plan, and execute the actions.”18 If an earthquake or tsunami causes human suffering in a 
developing state, there is often the expectation that wealthier countries have a responsibility 
to respond. Simply by being aware of the need and by having the capacity to act, one 
becomes responsible for doing so. In a global setting, more powerful actors are seen as 
responsible for maintaining international peace and security by virtue of their military 
capability. However, even weak actors can find themselves incurring burdens of 
responsibility on the basis of capacity. For example, in the last few years Syria’s neighbors 
have found themselves having to accept significant numbers of refugees due to their 
geographic proximity to the conflict. Their capacity to act is stretched thin but is still intact, 
and so their responsibility remains. Significantly, a change in capacity is generally 
understood to effect a change in responsibility. Thus Julian Culp states, “It seems relatively 
uncontroversial to think that rising powers possess greater responsibility to contribute to 
global public goods because of their greater capacity to do so.”19 
Inherent in much of the talk about responsible action is that responsibility implies a 
moral obligation or duty.
20
 To say we are responsible for someone suggests an obligation to 
look after their wellbeing. In the above scenario involving a tsunami, richer countries have a 
“capacity obligation” to respond even though they did not cause the natural disaster.21 When 
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capacity alone drives a response, this constitutes a “thin” chain of moral obligation, 
ultimately compelled by membership in the loose community of humanity.
22
 Thicker moral 
connections derive from prior social relationships, such as familial ties, kinship, community, 
or trusteeship. Obligatory responsibilities can also derive from social position, as the above 
discussion of social roles implies. Actors can be ascribed a “status obligation” based on their 
position within the social hierarchy, with those at the top assumed to have the greatest 
responsibility for the wellbeing of others and the maintenance of society as a whole.
23
 
This latter aspect highlights the way actors are not only responsible for others but also 
responsible to them on the basis of social bonds and prior behavior. Being responsible 
implies being accountable as well. Actors are responsible for the processes they set in 
motion—what may be termed “contributory obligations.” If their industrialization has caused 
environmental damage, or if their military actions led to wider regional conflict, they are 
responsible for ameliorating the effects. When it comes to institutions, if a state has helped to 
establish them, then it is expected to work to maintain their norms and functions. 
The level of responsibility of a given actor is never fully determined by its specific 
contribution to outcomes. For one thing, actors can be both individually and collectively 
responsible at the same time. In international politics, states are individually responsible for 
their actions as well as collectively responsible in a more diffuse way for the actions of their 
allies and the institutions, groups, and coalitions to which they belong.
24
 The larger and more 
powerful the state, the denser the web of networks of responsibility that are in operation. The 
different levels of contribution to social problems such as climate change have led to calls for 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” to mitigate them.25 These requests are motivated 
by the sense that some states have contributed more to climate change, but also entail 
recognition of different capacities among states to respond. 
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Responsible action, on the other hand, is evaluated in relation to the characteristics of 
the act and the situation. We expect action to be timely, proportionate, prudent, 
consequential, effective, and legitimate, but the precise act itself may vary according to the 
context. As with much ethical theory, there are debates over the relative importance of 
intentions, the moral quality of the act, and the nature of the outcomes when determining 
whether a certain action is responsible or irresponsible.
26
 Designating an action as responsible 
also depends in part on whether the behavior is appropriate for the actor’s role or status. As 
such, evaluations of responsible action are imbued with considerations of identity and 
legitimacy.
27
 It is also important to remember that these evaluations are produced within a 
societal context and depend on the collective interpretation of other members of that society. 
Therefore, debates over responsibility reveal not only the character of the individual actor in 
question but also prevailing social norms and relationships. 
 
ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The major contribution of the English School to international relations theory lies in its 
analysis of international society. While accepting realist assumptions about the anarchical 
nature of the international system and the primacy of states as the key actors at the 
international level, English School theorists note the importance of social institutions and 
practices among states. These provide regularity in and make sense of global interactions. 
Over time, states have developed complex norms of behavior in war, diplomacy, international 
law, and trade, among other spheres. Thus, despite the reality of global anarchy, world 
politics is not a realm of pure chaos but a functioning society with long-standing patterns of 
behavior and beliefs that shape agency.  
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Furthermore, English School writers suggest that while states have a theoretical 
equality, in practice the burdens of responsibility for maintaining the norms and rules of 
international society are borne most heavily by great powers—states with the greatest share 
of military, economic, and social power. This situation emerged following the Napoleonic 
wars via the Concert of Europe, in which inequalities in the society of states became 
institutionalized in the European balance of power system.
28
 Certain key states were afforded 
the opportunity to decide on behalf of weaker powers, and the latter were compelled to 
bandwagon with more powerful ones.
29
 This inequality is embodied today in the UN Charter 
and the UN Security Council, where five permanent members are afforded a veto.
30
 Adam 
Watson describes the Council as a “collective hegemonial authority,” enjoying the unique 
privilege of being the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes legitimate behavior in the security 
realm, with all other states being bound by its decisions.
31
 
For English School writers, this exalted position comes at a price. As Hedley Bull 
once asserted, “Great powers cannot expect to be conceded special rights if they do not 
perform special duties.”32 In particular, they are expected to act in response to crises within 
international society if they wish to retain their legitimacy and authority. Ian Clark argues 
that this operates at two levels: great powers are expected to reach agreement among 
themselves about how to deal with societal challenges (horizontal concert) as well as guide 
and represent the wishes of wider international society (vertical hierarchy).
33
 Above all, these 
states are meant to provide leadership and exhibit farsightedness, implying that short-term 
self-interest must at times be sacrificed to advance the wider public good.
34
 Indeed, Andrew 
Linklater asserts that English School writers such as John Vincent and Hedley Bull saw the 
very survival of international society as being dependent on the capacity of great powers to 
show “political imagination and practical wisdom.”35  
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Scholars have identified three tensions apparent in the operation of this system of 
unequally distributed responsibility. The first is the extent to which the great powers can be 
relied upon to act in a responsible fashion. Bull himself coined the term “great irresponsible” 
in critiquing the behavior of the dominant powers during the cold war.
36
 The idea that 
international society depends on great powers acting responsibly is refutable on the basis that 
great powers regularly fail to do so, yet international society still exists. Indeed, far from 
being responsible, Ken Booth has described great powers as gangsters and the society of 
states as a global protection racket.
37
 
The second tension relates to the social and cultural bases of international society. 
Early English School theorists highlighted the importance of the European origins of many of 
the mores and practices of that society and noted with concern that the rise of non-European 
actors might threaten its operation.
38
 Later writers acknowledged both the socialization 
processes encouraging common beliefs and behavior in international society as well as the 
more complex history of global interaction.
39
 Nevertheless, the extent to which action in 
international society relies on shared values and beliefs to function remains an important and 
open question. Ironically, the most radical challenge to the norms of international society has 
come not from new members of the great power club but from the established powers, who 
have questioned the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention in favor of communal 
responsibility for human rights standards.
40
 If this were accepted by all great powers, this 
would be unproblematic. However, non-Western great powers have either resisted these 
developments or advanced alternative interpretations. The idea of conditional sovereignty 
recalls nineteenth-century assertions of a “standard of civilization” and seems to conjure up 
uncomfortable historical memories of the imperialism and racism that drove great power 
behavior during European dominance.
41
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The third tension is centered on the question of how international society maintains 
itself. If certain members of this society threaten its stability, then the great powers are 
supposed to use punitive measures to bring them back into line—measures that ultimately 
include military force. The Christian Realist writer Reinhold Niebuhr once asserted that “all 
social cooperation on a larger scale . . . requires a measure of coercion,” and saw force as “an 
inevitable part of the process of social cohesion.”42 Assumption of great power status presents 
a dilemma to states such as Brazil, China, and India, which were once colonized and whose 
identity is defined in part by their struggle to resist coercion by external powers. Are they 
prepared to enforce social cohesion?
43
 If not, can they be entitled to claim the special 
privileges that great power status brings—such as permanent membership in the Security 
Council?  
Of course, viewing willingness to use force as a measure of legitimacy carries 
uncomfortable undertones of Nietzsche’s will to power and the idea that might equals right—
ideas that themselves challenge the rule of law and international order. These rising power 
states retain strong memories of their experience of colonialism,
44
 and so tend to define their 
responsibility in terms of contribution to global public goods rather than through the use of 
force.
45
 Yet in an anarchical society the potential exists for member states to emerge that 
subvert or actively threaten the society’s stability, and thus force must remain an option of 
last resort—hence its explicit authorization under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. While 
acknowledging the importance of nonintervention for international order, writers such as 
Bull, Vincent, and Nicholas Wheeler assert that a collective right of intervention is necessary 
at times of humanitarian need.
46
  
 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESPONSIBILITY: AN INTERPRETIVIST ANALYSIS 
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The remainder of this article analyzes statements made by representatives from Brazil, China, 
and India to the Security Council from January 1, 2011, to January 1, 2016, to try and 
understand how they conceptualize responsibility internationally. This five-year period is 
significant as it encompasses the Arab Spring and the series of associated dilemmas over 
intervention in Iraq, Libya, Mali, Syria, and Yemen. Building on the previous two sections, 
the analysis examines responsibility both as an identity trait of an actor and as a type of 
action, exploring how these states construct a sense of who the responsible actors are, and 
what constitutes responsible action, in a given situation. It does so in light of the assumptions 
that inform the English School: the way these powers conceive of and talk about 
responsibility matters because states are in constant dialogue about proper conduct in 
international society; and furthermore, using force is a necessary element of maintaining that 
society’s order. The resulting analysis illustrates how each actor developed its thinking about 
responsibility over time and adapted it in light of ongoing events and the responses of other 
states. 
During this time China, as one of the Permanent Five, sat on the Council for the entire 
period; Brazil was elected to serve for two years as a nonpermanent member from 2010 
through 2011; and India was elected to serve on the same basis from 2011 through 2012. 
Nevertheless, Brazil and India frequently contributed to debates on the invitation of the 
President, even when not officially serving on the Council. This section subjects those 
contributions to an interpretivist analysis as it seeks to uncover the meanings and 
understandings projected rhetorically by these states. Interpretivism sees “beliefs, meanings 
and language [as] constitutive of human actions and practices.”47 Thus, it is important to 
analyze the language that the three countries used to describe responsibility and their beliefs 
and meanings as evinced in Council discussions, as we can understand these to shape current 
and future practices.
48
 To do so, I have identified explicit references to responsibility (for 
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example, “the government of x is responsible”), synonyms implying responsibility (such as 
“accountable,” “answerable,” “blameworthy,” or “obliged”), as well as words connoting 
responsible identities (for example “mature,” “guardian,” “protector,” or “upholder”). In 
addition, I scoured these texts for representations of responsible or irresponsible action, either 
via the diction used (for example, “x has fulfilled its duty,” “x has been reckless,” “x has 
contributed,” etc.) or by the framing (for example, “as a responsible power, we have done 
x”).49 A detailed reading of these debates led to the identification of 245 statements of 
potential relevance spanning the five-year period, which form the data set of this analysis.
50
 
 
Responsible Actors 
When it comes to responsible actors, there are similarities in the ones that Brazil, China, and 
India identify. One group that all three countries regularly called upon to act is the 
“international community.” For example, China argued in 2011 that “the international 
community should continue to push for a political settlement of the question of Palestine.”51 
Similarly, India asserted in 2015 that “the international community must take an unequivocal 
and resolute position against terrorism and violent extremism.”52 Meanwhile, Brazil has 
suggested that “the international community, as it exercises its responsibility to protect, must 
demonstrate a high level of responsibility while protecting.”53 Each sees this community as 
exercising agency and implicitly notes an obligation for it to do so. 
However, there are differences in the number of times each state identifies the 
international community as a responsible collective group, and this is important. For China, 
the international community dominates its discourse. It is the most regularly cited actor, 
significantly above others, such as particular states or multilateral groups, with at least 227 
references. As the international community is an imprecise term, the effect of this is to render 
the location of responsibility extremely vague. Indeed, China’s framing of its own 
14 
 
responsibility is conveyed in a general and unspecific fashion for much of this period. For 
instance, it often notes that “China supports” a particular policy or initiative (48 times), but 
China’s contribution is usually not delineated. This could simply be a stylistic feature of 
China’s diplomatic discourse, but it nevertheless means that China’s statements lack language 
of concrete action and tangible policy contributions.
54
 
Brazil also refers to the international community regularly, at times praising its 
efficacy in preventing organized crime,
55
 while elsewhere decrying “the international 
community’s failure in dealing with the underlying causes of conflicts.”56 Yet, in contrast to 
China, Brazil often specifies how its own actions are contributing to the exercise of 
responsibility by that group. Examples include the 2012 statement that “eleven Brazilian 
observers have served with the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria for the past three 
months”57 and the 2015 assertion by the Brazilian representative that “as chair of the 
[Peacebuilding Commission’s] Guinea-Bissau configuration, Brazil hopes to count on the 
support of the international community in assisting Guinea-Bissau.”58 In this way, Brazil’s 
agency and its link to that of the wider international community are made more explicit.  
When it comes to India, its references to the international community are sparser. 
That said, Indian representatives do identify India as part of this group and thus imply that 
India is implicated in any duty of responsibility that flows to and from it. For example, “In 
our view, which we share with most members of the international community, there can be 
no reason or motivation that can possibly justify terrorism.”59 India also provides precise 
examples to illustrate its own contribution to responsible agency in international society. In 
particular, it regularly cites its record of support for peacekeeping. Indian representatives 
argue that “United Nations peacekeeping is one of the key instruments available to the 
international community to protect people from the scourge of war and lawlessness. India has 
contributed, through ideas and resources, to global efforts towards protecting civilians.”60 In 
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2014, India boasted it had “deployed more than 170,000 troops in 43 out of the 64 United 
Nations peacekeeping operations so far,” and posited that “our experience shows that robust 
international cooperation among the concerned Member States of the United Nations is the 
most sustainable method for addressing conflicts between them.”61 
Another actor identified by the three countries as a key locus of responsibility is the 
Security Council itself. Again, there seems to be a level of agreement among Brazil, China, 
and India on the Council’s role as a responsible collective actor. In particular, all three 
identify the Council as having primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security. Nevertheless, they all raise concerns about the expansion of that body’s remit. For 
instance, China asserts that the Council “lacks expertise in climate change and the necessary 
means and resources ” to address that issue, and it noted that “the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol have been commonly 
accepted as major channels for responding to climate change.”62 India likewise argues that 
“the United Nations has a Framework Convention with a toolbox of ways and means of 
addressing climate change, none of which is available to the Security Council.”63 Brazil 
agrees, based on its assertion that “security tools are appropriate to deal with concrete threats 
to international peace and security, but they are inadequate to address complex and 
multidimensional issues such as climate change.”64 Yet, Brazil does not label the Council 
itself as inadequate, and so is less explicitly hostile than the other two nations toward the idea 
that it might take on the responsibility of tackling climate change. 
China identifies a “principle of common but differentiated responsibility” in operation 
under the UNFCCC and Kyoto frameworks—one that is favorable to China on the basis of its 
developing status.
65
 This would presumably be less applicable if brought under the auspices 
of the Council, since in that forum China has permanent membership and so might be 
expected to shoulder a greater burden of responsibility. Rather than couch this in terms of 
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self-interest, China avers that “the Council is not a forum for decision-making with universal 
representation. Its discussions are not aimed at putting together a broadly accepted 
programme.”66 This argument is echoed in India’s statement that “climate change needs the 
collective understanding and support of all Member States. Action must therefore lie in the 
UNFCCC.”67  
What all three share, then, is a sense that the Security Council should focus on 
military security matters and avoid encroaching on nonmilitary security governance, which 
they view as the responsibility of the UN General Assembly or specialist agencies.
68
 Where 
they differ is in how far they perceive the Council to be a legitimate, responsible actor. On 
the one hand, each of them participates in Council debates and often urges Council members 
to take responsibility for action. India took its seat in 2011 with the affirmation that “we 
understand the expectations that accompany our Council membership,” promising to work 
closely with the permanent members to promote development and security.
69
 Yet India and to 
a lesser extent Brazil each draw attention to the problematic nature of the Council’s 
membership and present this as having negative effects on its ability to act responsibly. 
Repeatedly, India’s representatives emphasize that the structure of the Council needs reform 
and that the permanent and nonpermanent categories of membership should be expanded.
70
 It 
also argues that the successful promotion of the rule of law as a core value of the UN system 
is predicated on Council reform.
71
 In sum, India views the current narrow Council 
membership, particularly of the permanent category, as hampering the body’s legitimacy, and 
thus negatively affecting perceptions of its right to take responsible action on behalf of the 
wider international community. Brazil also asserts that “only a real reform of the Council’s 
structure will make this body more representative, transparent, efficient, and legitimate.”72  
By contrast, China, although supportive of reforming the Council’s working methods, 
is muted on the question of membership, stating that “the Security Council should continue to 
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strengthen its interaction and dialogue with non-Council members and pay more attention to 
the opinions of relevant Member States that are connected to the Council’s agenda.”73 China 
tends to affirm the Council’s legitimacy implicitly by referencing the history of its founding, 
which in China’s estimation derives from the heroic struggle against Nazi Germany and 
imperial Japan in World War II.
74
 Brazil and India, however, interpret the historical basis of 
the Council’s legitimacy more negatively. Rather than enhancing its authority, both see its 
1945 origins as evidence that it no longer fits the contemporary reality of power and 
responsibility in the early twenty-first century.
75
  
China also diverges from Brazil and India in the relative importance it attaches to its 
membership of global clubs and multilateral groups.
76
 Although in 2015 it makes reference to 
its involvement in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and its initiative on China-Africa 
Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, it does not mention other bodies to which it 
belongs in this five-year period, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as possible 
responsible actors in the security field.
77
 Thus, for China, the Security Council is the only 
body of significance for its security decision-making. By contrast, India and Brazil frequently 
describe how clubs such as IBSA play a role in providing aid to the Palestinian authority and 
Haiti via the IBSA Fund, and an IBSA delegation that visited Syria in August 2011 is cited 
by India as making constructive efforts to promote peace.
78
 All three states call for greater 
coordination between the Council and regional organizations, such as the African Union and 
the Arab League, but India goes further in suggesting that IBSA and the African Union 
should work together in “promoting South-South perspectives on development and security” 
separately from the Security Council’s purview.79 Such citations are conveyed as evidence of 
good faith by Brazil and India as contributors to the wider public good of security, but they 
also imply that clubs such as IBSA have a role in security provision autonomous from that of 
the Council. 
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Beyond the international community and the Security Council, the only other actors 
that China identifies as bearing responsibility in world politics are national governments. 
Whether it is discussing security sector reform, development, or conflict resolution, China 
continually repeats the position that national governments should bear the primary 
responsibility in many cases. Crucially, when it comes to conflict management, China argues 
that “the primary responsibility in protecting innocent civilians from the harm of conflict and 
wars lies with national Governments,”80 and emphasizes that in discharging this 
responsibility “it is essential that the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations be strictly complied with, particularly those concerning respect for national 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.”81 It is therefore notable that, with regard to the 
conflict in Syria, China has continually resisted efforts to blame the Syrian government for 
violations of international humanitarian law. This stands in contrast to Brazil, whose 
representatives have repeatedly stated that the Syrian government was responsible for the 
violence against civilians. 
When it comes to defining themselves as responsible actors, as noted above, India and 
Brazil both identify their positive contributions to peacekeeping and development initiatives 
as evidence of their responsibility. India often does this by drawing on its history. It combines 
India’s colonial experience and subsequent struggle for independence with its democratic 
character to legitimize its claim of being responsible. In 2011 its representative noted that 
“India brings to this table almost sixty years of experience in overcoming many of the 
challenges of transforming a colonial legacy into a modern dynamic nation of a billion people 
who are trying to meet their aspirations within a democratic system dedicated to the rule of 
law.”82 Brazil tends to highlight its contribution to peace in its region as providing the 
credentials for its identity as a responsible actor, exemplified by its statement that “along with 
our neighbours, we are consolidating South America as an area of peace, democracy, and 
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cooperation . . . free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.”83 
Brazilian representatives also emphasize their country’s rejection of the use of force and 
experience in the noncoercive aspects of diplomacy, such as by declaring that “Brazil values 
and encourages efforts in mediation, good offices, early warning, and conciliation 
measures.”84  
As discussed above, China was vaguer in its presentation of itself as a responsible 
actor, at least in the early part of the period in question. Its representatives largely spoke in 
generalities, such as “China is closely following the unfolding situation in Syria,”85 or “China 
favours the Council’s more active and practical involvement in this issue.”86 References to 
specific policies or China’s own behavior early in this five-year period were rare, but this 
situation gradually changed in response to criticism over its use of the veto regarding Syria. 
When Russia and China vetoed a resolution on October 4, 2011, China was more explicit 
than usual about its actions, noting that it “always participated positively and constructively 
in the consultations on the relevant draft resolutions.”87 When it issued a second veto on 
February 24, 2012, it faced significant criticism from the United Kingdom and the United 
States as well as from nonpermanent Council members.
88
 This is perhaps why it felt moved to 
be more overt on March 12, 2012, both about its actions and its identity as a responsible 
actor. Unusually, the Chinese representative specified that China would “provide $2 million 
in emergency humanitarian relief to the Syrian people” via the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. It then went on to assert that “as a permanent member of the Security Council, 
China stands ready to shoulder its full responsibilities, engage in patient and full consultation 
with all sides on an equal basis, and push for an early political settlement of the Syrian 
crisis.”89 
By the time it exercised its veto a third time, in July 2012, China was being directly 
accused of irresponsibility by other Council members. As the U.K. representative argued, 
20 
 
“By exercising their veto today, Russia and China have failed in their responsibilities as 
permanent members of the Security Council to help resolve the crisis in Syria.”90 The U.K. 
representative went on to assert, “We shall continue to work with the Envoy, the Secretary-
General, and responsible members of the international community”—implying that China 
was outside this latter category.
91
 In the face of this criticism, China declared that it had “no 
self-interest in the Syrian issue” and asserted,  
 
We have consistently maintained that the future and fate of Syria should be independently 
decided by the Syrian people, rather than imposed by outside forces. We believe that the 
Syrian issue must be resolved through political means and that military means would achieve 
nothing. That is China’s consistent position on international affairs.92  
 
Thus, China felt compelled to articulate an overarching rationale for its behavior, and the one 
it chose constituted a rejection of military coercion. The implication of this viewpoint is that 
responsible actors are those that eschew the use of force. China later defended its position on 
Syria as “consistent and responsible” on the basis that it supports “a political settlement of the 
issue in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
the basic norms governing international relations.”93 In contrast, China suggested that “a few 
countries have been eager to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, to fuel the 
flames and to sow discord in complete disregard of the possible consequences.”94 Given the 
history of UN Security Council resolutions leading to military force and regime change in 
Iraq and Libya, it is both rhetorically effective and understandable that China was cautious 
about supporting condemnation of the Syrian government, lest such a condemnation be used 
to legitimize the use of force at a later date. Yet the Brazilian and Indian representatives, who 
were also critical of calls for the use of force in Syria, did not feel the need to vote against the 
three resolutions that China vetoed. India voted in favor of the resolution on July 19, 2012, on 
21 
 
the basis that it supported the work of the Joint Special Envoy, former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan.
95
 In short, India and Brazil are not willing to close off collective UN action in 
Syria in case it later legitimizes force, and they do not see condemnation of Syrian 
government abuses as a violation of sovereignty, unlike China. 
To summarize, evidence from the UN Security Council debates indicates some 
agreement among Brazil, China, and India when it comes to defining responsible actors in 
international society. All three accept the Council as the primary decision-making body in the 
security field; all three express concern that the scope of this body’s responsibility should not 
encroach on the work of the General Assembly and UN agencies; and all three indicate that 
being a responsible power entails contributing to diplomacy and avoiding the resort to force. 
Yet Brazil and India see the legitimacy of the Council as being compromised by its 
unrepresentative nature, affecting the authority and effectiveness with which it assumes 
responsibility, whereas China is muted on this issue. That said, China used its veto three 
times to prevent Council resolutions condemning the Syrian government. Brazil and India, by 
contrast, either abstained or voted in favor, suggesting a greater reluctance to oppose the will 
of the majority of the Security Council despite shared concerns that Western states were 
gearing up for intervention.  
 
Responsible Action 
Having examined how these states identify responsible actors, I now turn to their construction 
of responsible action. First, it is important to note that beliefs about which actors are 
responsible shape the kinds of action that are then, in turn, framed as responsible. For 
instance, advancing the “international community” as a responsible actor does not then lead 
to favoring concrete political or military action, as that would require institutional structures 
that would narrow participation to specific members with defined responsibilities. It also 
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militates against coercive diplomacy due to the greater range of states that would have to 
agree to support punitive action. As India’s representative noted in 2011, “The international 
community can encourage, motivate, and facilitate. It cannot impose solutions.”96 This may 
be why China so often promotes this community as the preeminent responsible actor. China 
promotes responsible behavior as that which provides “constructive assistance” and 
prescribes “dialogue, consultation, and other peaceful means” to “achieve proper solutions 
through inclusive political processes.”97  
This viewpoint is most starkly expressed in its statement on September 27, 2013: 
“China opposes the use of force in international relations.”98 It is, of course, one thing to say, 
as China does in the next sentence, that “military means cannot solve the Syrian issue”; but to 
frame opposition to military force as a stand-alone and uncompromising principle of China’s 
approach to international society is highly problematic from the English School perspective, 
which views coercion as necessary for upholding a society’s norms. China’s rhetoric in this 
statement raises the question of how it would confront, interdict, or prevent actors from 
committing genocide or otherwise destabilizing international peace and security. It also sits 
uneasily with China’s defense budget, which increased by an average of 12.9 percent per year 
between 1989 and 2010 and was increasing by double digits for much of the period under 
scrutiny.
99
 Therefore, it clearly does not reject the use of force per se, only in the service of 
certain societal goals.
100
 
India conveys a similar skepticism about coercion in its statements, arguing that 
“coercive measures should be avoided and used as a measure of last resort, implemented with 
extreme care and caution.”101 Like China, it too universalizes this concern as an underlying 
norm of international society, asserting that “international law is based on the principle of 
consent.”102 Indian representatives in the Council criticize a “trend towards increased reliance 
on the use of force as a mechanism for resolving . . . conflicts” and portray this as being 
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irresponsible and based on a lack of patience and political will rather than a prudent choice of 
action.
103
 This position is justified by linking it to India’s prior experience of contributing to 
UN peacekeeping: “As the major troop-contributing country to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, we are more familiar than most with the limitations of force.”104 In that sense, 
they imply that practical considerations are driving their reluctance to resort to force rather 
than China’s emphasis on pure principle. Similarly, India’s assertion that it “has always 
opposed and will continue to oppose the use of force as a primary reaction to conflict” is 
subtly more permissive than China’s position, since it adds the qualifier “as a primary 
reaction” and not as a reaction per se. Nonetheless, India’s statements at the Council during 
this time do not provide a substantive argument on when and how coercion is permissible.  
Discussing the dilemmas of peacekeeping in 2014, the Indian representative asks, 
“Does the peacekeeper shoot to protect?” but does not answer his own question.105 Raising an 
incident when two Indian peacekeepers died protecting refugees from an armed mob on 
December 19, 2013, he dramatically captures the dilemma of using force in the service of 
humanitarian aims: “Had they opened fire, hundreds of lives would have been lost. Would 
those lives have been civilians or combatants? And the troops who availed themselves of 
their superior fire power, would they have been peacekeepers or war-makers?”106 Here again, 
however, the Indian representative does not answer his own rhetorical questions, and so the 
larger question of when and how to use force responsibly is left unaddressed. 
A similar difficulty arises from Brazil’s approach to international responsibility. 
There are frequent references in Brazil’s statements to the negative effects of the use of 
force.
107
 As a result, they reject what they present as a tendency to draw an “almost automatic 
link between the protection of civilians and the use of force.”108 For Brazil, prevention is a 
more important facet of responsibility than military action.
109
 It condemns sanctions because 
they create “a logic of punishment and isolation, instead of a dynamic of dialogue and 
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persuasion.”110 This appears to mirror the position of China and India. Yet Brazil differs from 
these states by making an imaginative contribution to the debate. Its concept of 
Responsibility While Protecting (RwP) acknowledges the necessity of coercive force at 
times, but the concept goes further by seeking to contain coercive force within a framework 
of legal controls and political authority. As Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho note of 
RwP, “Never before had questions of who should intervene, under what legitimate authority, 
and with which mechanisms of transparency and accountability been debated so explicitly in 
a setting with such a broad audience and at this level of detail.”111 Such is a significant 
achievement, even if Brazil later retreated from pursuing the doctrine. 
As with China, Brazil rejects the utility of force in Syria
112
 and criticizes the 
“hastened resort to coercive measures,”113 but does accept that it is necessary at times in the 
face of humanitarian emergencies. RwP might be seen as offering a more permissive take on 
military action, but in practice Brazil’s assertion that “one casualty is one too many, no 
matter how noble the intentions” places an impractical burden on intervening forces.114 It is 
part of the nature of war that civilians are liable to be killed, and so presenting such casualties 
as intolerable has the effect of rendering all forms of military intervention irresponsible. 
Indeed, Brazil later modified its position in response to criticism of RwP’s sequencing.115  
Interestingly, Brazil draws a distinction in the Council between “collective 
responsibility” involving non-coercive means and “collective security,” which is described as 
involving “a case-by-case political assessment by the Security Council.”116 This seems to 
imply that responsibility as a collective concept lies outside the military realm and relates 
only to non-coercive measures. 
In sum, Brazil, China, and India describe the precipitate resort to force as 
irresponsible. They also critique the use of coercion by external actors to compel a change of 
policy by a national government as being contrary to the spirit of the United Nations. As 
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such, they problematize the role of coercion in maintaining international society’s vertical 
hierarchy. In addition, all three raise concerns about horizontal coercion among the members 
of the UN Security Council. China, for example, asserts that “the Council should avoid 
forcing through texts over which there remain serious differences, so as to safeguard the 
solidarity of the Council.”117 
India has critiqued the working methods of the Council, bemoaning the “practice of 
taking decisions among the five permanent members to the exclusion of other Council 
members.”118 This implies that the permanent members constitute an internal hierarchy 
within the Council and among great powers, which undermines the solidarity of this body and 
leads to de facto coercion by compelling other members to go along with a decision reached 
in secret.
119
 As noted, India also questions the legitimacy of the current makeup of the 
Council and calls for reform of its membership as well as greater dialogue between members 
and nonmembers.  
If, as Niebuhr and the English School argue, coercion underpins a functioning 
international society, then the disquiet expressed in this regard by each of these states will 
make it difficult for them to adopt the role of “great responsible” in the future. Still, an 
alternative means of exercising responsibility is put forward in the discourse of these states. 
Restraint, dialogue, patience, and respect for the agency of others are all concepts advanced 
by Brazil, China, and India as crucial for responsible diplomacy at the level of the Security 
Council. Although each differs in its specific interpretation of who the responsible actors are, 
they all tend to favor an interpretation of responsibility that is non-coercive, deliberative, and 
consensual. It is conceivable that this kind of responsibility could function alongside the more 
militaristic understanding of states such as France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. For example, Brazil, China, and India see differentiated responsibility as a 
positive aspect of the climate change regime and argue that this same kind of rationale should 
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be applied to the security field. Yet these states also often imply that the exercise of coercion 
is irresponsible, an assertion that is more problematic. It is one thing to exclude oneself from 
acting coercively, but to discourage others from using coercion to uphold international peace 
and security seems to posit the utopian possibility of an international society functioning 
according to a logic that goes against its anarchical nature. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting the differing intellectual contributions that these states 
make to the practices of international society. If English School scholars are correct that 
imagination is crucial to the survival of that society, then these putative great powers offer 
significantly different inputs into its creative workings. Brazil advanced the RwP doctrine 
and argued for cultural plurality among member states during this period. India provided a 
note on improving the working methods of the Council, a letter on UN peacekeeping 
operations, and has long advocated reform of Council membership. China, by contrast, 
offered neither note nor letter, nor any doctrinal contribution of substance. Indeed, it 
presented no philosophical framework for thinking about international society at all, with the 
exceptions of the aforementioned blanket rejection of the use of force and a brief allusion to 
the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” in 2014, which are said to have driven China’s 
engagement with the world since they were formulated in 1954.
120
 If responsibility requires 
the exercise of imagination, then China has failed to think responsibly.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding analysis has revealed a resistance on the part of all three states to the notion 
that coercive force is a facet of responsible behavior. Rather, those actors often emphasize 
forbearance and patience. In the cases of Brazil and India, resistance to the use of force was 
paired with attempts to offer imaginative contributions to dilemmas, such as humanitarian 
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intervention and Security Council reform. Each provided tangible evidence of its support for 
peacekeeping and development as well as its involvement in peace initiatives in particular 
regions. By contrast, China provided little intellectual creativity in these areas. Its 
presidencies of the Council passed without any substantive efforts to shape new 
developments. While China’s representative made occasional reference to his country’s 
assistance in regional development initiatives and peacekeeping efforts, these were rare and 
tended to come in response to criticism of China’s irresponsibility in not condemning human 
rights abuses in Syria. 
Brazil and India’s positions on the use of force are ambiguous. India raised a number 
of issues with the practice of peace enforcement without elaborating a systematic response. 
Moreover, in practice, India has actually used force in its region while turning a blind eye to 
human rights abuses by its neighbors—in Sri Lanka, for instance. For its part, Brazil’s 
innovation of RwP risked placing an impossible burden on the conduct of military missions. 
Nevertheless, in proposing new ideas, these states elicit responses from other states in 
international society and challenge conventional thinking. On the other hand, China’s 
contribution to the public good of international peace and security, on the evidence of its own 
statements, amounts to dispatching envoys to Syria, increasing its peacekeeping contributions 
to South Sudan, and preventing the exercise of coercive force under a UN Security Council 
mandate.
121
 For some, this in itself might constitute responsible behavior compared to the 
erratic resort to military action by other Council members, such as the United States. Yet to 
refuse to theorize when and how coercion should be practiced is to ignore one of the most 
vital aspects of responsibility in this sphere.  
Recalling our earlier theoretical discussion, being responsible requires the capacity 
and willingness to respond to crises. For English School theorists, this ultimately means using 
coercive force in times of need to uphold international society’s norms.122 The importance of 
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this analysis is to show the stickiness of this conception of great power responsibility. Thus, 
France and the United Kingdom, despite their relative decline, arguably remain great powers 
because they are able and willing to use force globally in response to threats to international 
society, such as the rise of the Islamic State. Brazil and India admit that force does have a 
role in maintaining international order, even as they seek to curtail its use in all but the most 
extreme cases. China’s efforts to define great power responsibility differently, in terms of 
rejecting force and contributing to security governance in other ways, are struggling to gain 
traction among other Security Council members. As its military power grows, such 
contradictions are only going to become more stark. If other states will not accept its 
redefinition, China will be labeled a “great irresponsible.” 
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